Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

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TRSE-00 MBFR-03 SAJ-01 ACDA-19 STR-08 AGR-20 EB-11

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: MILI, GW, PFOR

SUBJECT: FINANCE MINISTER SCHMIDT'S REMARKS ON US-EUROPEAN

RELATIONS

1. SUMMARY: IN AN INTERVIEW IN THE GENERAL ANZEIGER AUGUST 22, HELMUT SCHMIDT REVIEWED CURRENT US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS. HE SAID THE WAY THE US INITIATED THE YEAR OF EUROPE POLICY WAS NOT TOO HAPPY AND WHILE CRITICIZING THE LACK OF CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND EUROPE ABOUT THE US-SOVIET AGREEMENT TO PREVENT NUCLEAR WAR, SCHMIDT THROUGHT THAT THE AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE LITTLE EFFECT ON THE US COMMITMENT TO EUROPE. HE SAID HE WAS NOT SURE HOW THE DEBATE IN THE US ABOUT THE REDUCTION OF US TROOPS IN EUROPE WOULD ULTIMATELY END. HE ALSO NOTED THE FAILURE OF THE EUROPEANS TO PREPARE AN ADEQUATE RESPONSE TO THE KISSINGER INITIATIVE. END SUMMARY.

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2. SCHMIDT THOUGHT THAT WESTERN EUROPE COULD PLAY AN IMPORTANT

ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS IN THE 1980'S. ALTHOUGH HE RECOGNIZED THERE ARE REASONS NOT TO BE TOO OPTIMISTIC, HE SAID THAT EUROPE CLEARLY DOES NOT NOW PLAY SUCH A ROLE BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS ARE BECOMING MORE CONSCIOUS OF THIS SITUATION. HE NOTED THAT THE WAY IN WHICH THE US GOVERNMENT INITIATED THE "YEAR OF EUROPE" WAS NOT TOO HAPPY. HE SAID: "MUCH LESS HAPPY IS THE FACT THAT THE STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY HAVE NOT YET FOUND A COMMON ANSWER TO THIS AMERICAN INITIATIVE. I DO NOT SEEK TO LABEL ANYONE WITH THE BLAME, BUT I VERY MUCH WISH TO POINT OUT THAT FAVORITE IDEAS OF INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL FOREIGN POLICIES CANNOT PLAY THE LEADING ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMMON FOREIGN POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY."

- 3. ON THE US-SOVIET AGREEMENT FOR THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR, SCHMIDT SAID THAT HE HAD EARLIER DISCUSSED THE POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THE AGREEMENT. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME A GOVERNMENT AGREEMENT CONFIRMED THAT THE 15 YEAR OLD NATO DEFENSE DOCTRINE CONTAINED QUESTIONABLE ASPECTS. MOREOVER, THERE WAS THE PECULIAR AND UNUSUAL PROCEDURE WHICH PRECEDED THE CONCLUSION OF THE AGREEMENT. WHILE ALL NATO PARTNERS AND THE USA PUT GREAT VALUE ON THE BROAD, WELL-ORGANIZED AND RECIPROCAL INFORMATION AND CONSULATIONS IN ALL PHASES OF THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS (AS WELL AS MBFT AND CSCE TALKS) SIMILAR PROCEDURES WERE NOT FOLLOWED FOR THE BREZHNEV-NIXON AGREEMENT, EVEN THOUGH IT HAD A VERY IMPORTANT MEANING FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE POLICY. "IF SUCH PROCEDURES WERE TO BE IMITATED, MUTUAL CONFIDENCE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE WOULD BE JEOPARDIZED."
- 4. SCHMIDT THOUGHT THE NUCLEAR AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE LITTLE EFFECT ON THE US COMMITMENT TOWARD EUROPE. HE SAID "I BELIEVE THE EVER STRONGER TENDENCY IN THE US CONGRESS TO REDUCE US TROOPS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND EUROPE HAS DEVELOPED INDEPENDENTLY OF THIS AGREEMENT. AFTER ALL THE HIGHLY RESPECTED SENATOR MANSFIELD HAS REPRESENTED HIS POINT OF VIEW FOR THE LAST SEVENTEEN YEARS. I THINK THAT IN THIS CONNECTION THE AGREEMENT HAS NO ADDITIONAL IMPORTANCE AND THAT ITS TEXT CAN BE INTERPRETED AS BEING IN AGREEMENT WITH NATO'S MILITARY AND POLITICAL STRATEGIES WHICH HAVE EXISTED UP TO THE PRESENT TIME."
- 5. SCHMIDT THOUGHT, HOWEVER, THAT THE AGREEMENT COULD LEAD TO NEW UNCLASSIFIED

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DEVELOPMENTS. HE SAID THE ISSUE CREATED CONDITIONS FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS WHICH WE HAVE NOT KNOWN INTHE PAST. "IN THE CONTROVERSIAL KISSINGER TALK OF APRIL ON THE YEAR OF EUROPE, WE FIND WHAT IN MY OPINION IS A SOMEWHAT LESS THAN HAPPY-FORMULATION WHICH DISTINGUISHES BETWEEN AMERICAN WORLD-WIDE SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE REGIONAL SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE EUROPEANS. AT LEAST IN A PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL SENSE THIS IS NOT A VERY APPROPRIATE DIFFERENTIATION, WHICH UNDERLINES THE GLOBAL AGREEMENT

BETWEEN BREZHNEV AND NIXON AFFECTING THE ENTIRE WORLD. AND THIS, ON THE OTHER HAND, DIMINSHES THE WEIGHT OF THE EUROPEAN PARTNERS CALLED UPON TO CO-DECIDE."

6. SCHMIDT NOTED THAT ONE OF KISSINGER'S MOTIVES BEHIND THE YEAR OF EUROPE TALK WAS TO BRING BETTER ORDER INTO US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS. "IN THIS RESPECT, I VALUED HIS TALK POSITIVELY AT THE TIME, BUT I WOULD NOT SAY THIS TALK WAS FOMRED BY ONLY ONE CONEPT. IT IS A FACT, HOWEVER, THAT THE NINE EC STATES, EXCEPT FOR CRITICISM OF THE US POLICY, HAVE NOT SO FAR DEVELOPED ANOTHER CONCEPT."

7. SCHMIDT THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE A REALISTIC REARRANGEMENT OF THE WORLD BALANCE OF POWER UNLESS EUROPE BECAME MORE UNIFIED POLITICALLY. HE NOTED THAT IDEAS IN WASHINGTON ABOUT THE FUTURE OF EUROPE ARE CONTRADICTORY. A CONTRADICTION EXISTED, FOR INSTANCE, BETWEEN THE MONETARY POLICY WHICH FORMER SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY CONNNALLY SUPPORTED AND THE "MUCH MORE RATIONAL AND COOPERATIVE POLICY OF THE CURRENT SECRE-TARY OF TREASURY SHULTZ." HE OBSERVED THAT US TRADE POLICY WAS ALSO CONTRADICTORY. ONE CANNOT, HE THOUGHT, DEMAND THAT EUROPE IMPORT AMERICAN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AND AT THE SAME TIME PUT AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS UNDER CONTROLS IN ORDER TO LIMIT THE RISE OF US DOMESTIC PRICES. HE ALSO NOTED THERE ARE CONTRADICTIONS AMONG VARIOUS CENTERS OF AMERICAN POLICY, IN PARTICULAR DIFFERENCES OVER THE QUESTIONS OF TROOP REDUCTION BETWEEN THE SENATE AND THE WHITE HOUSE. "WHEN AND WHICH TENDENCE WILL FINALLY WIN OUT IS FOR US EUROPEANS NOT QUITE CLEAR." IN ADDITION, IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER BECAUSE OF THE INTERNAL POLICY PROBLEMS THE ADMINISTRATION WILL ACTUALLY BE IN A POSITION TO CARRY THROUGH ITS FOREIGN POLICY IDEAS, FINALLY, SCHMIDT NOTED THAT A COMMON EUROPEAN SECURITY POLICY IS NOT YET POSSIBLE, AT LEAST UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE FRENCH RECONSIDER THEIR POSITION AND FOR THEIR OWN REASONS DECIDE TO UNCLASSIFIED

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PLAY A DIFFERENT ROLE IN EUROPE. CASH

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